The Responsibility of the Military Historian

Souls vs. sentiments. They are two words which evoke two very different impressions. As I was working on the manuscript for BATTLE SURGEONS, I found myself having to decide which word was more appropriate - or more importantly, conveyed the right feeling.

Although it may be a trifling point, these words shape a reader’s subconscious perception, informing their impression of an action. These little things become big things.

Take it from Brigadier General Ralph “Doc” Eaton. As one of the oldest men in the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II - he had served as a medic on the Western Front during The Great War, earning him his lifelong nickname - he became General Ridgway’s closest confidant during the war.

Eaton had been consulted by SLA Marshall as the latter crafted his narrative on the 82nd Airborne in Normandy; it would be published as part of the infamous “Green Books,” in 1948. Eaton was pleased with the drafts he reviewed.

The final product, however, he had serious problems with. As he wrote to his old boss, Matthew Ridgway:

Official histories of other wars were stilted and often consisted of field orders which did not properly portray how operations were actually carried out. The actual deeds performed or not performed, the difficulties met, the elements of good luck and bad luck, etc. were naturally omitted. The decision to write history from interviews and to publish truths on how missions were accomplished in detail was a sound change in the old (dry) traditional manner. However, great care should, by necessity, have been exercised in seeing that histories did not become novels. It is entirely too easy to interject a word or phrase with adds to the zest of the reader but slurs the truth and reflects on the integrity and character of units and individuals.

…

I feel sure that he, [SLA] Marshall, did not write the final edition. Some “ghost” writer, who in a poor attempt to glamourize battle, wrote the final history. The final editor, who could be General Malony, failed to realize the import of such expressions as “continued failure” (p.75); “mission still unaccomplished” (which gave the impression that no part of mission was accomplished) (p.65); “anxiety at the command post” (p.63); “Prepared to continue his mission when reinforcements came” (p.61). Those expressions could be applicable to a selective service, National Guard, or even Regular Army Division which was getting its baptism of fire, but not to a volunteer division containing the highest type of fighting men which had already proven its courage and stability in combat.

…

I strongly feel that the phrases enumerated should be deleted or revised to present factual events and feelings.

Words have meaning.

Choose wisely.

COL Ralph Eaton